NOTE
LEEDOM v. KYNE AND THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF A NATIONAL
LABOR POLICY
Twenty-three years ago, in Leedom v. Kyne, l the United States
Supreme Court held that under certain circumstances a federal district
court has jurisdiction to set aside a representation order issued by the
National Labor Relations Board. 2 The Court affirmed the district
court's exercise of jurisdiction in Kyne because the Board's representation order exceeded "its delegated powers and [was] contrary to a specific prohibition ' 3 in the National Labor Relations Act.4 Recently,
Chief Judge Wright of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, in his dissenting opinion in PhysiciansNationalHouse Staff
Association v. Fanning,5 reformulated the Kyne standard. 6 He proposed a four-part test to determine
district court jurisdiction to review
7
Board representation orders.
Three notable deficiencies in the Kyne standard make its reformulation appropriate. First, the Kyne standard provides no guidelines to
aid courts in determining when statutory mandates8 command Board
action. Because Congress and the courts have allowed the Board to
1. 358 U.S. 184 (1958). For a discussion of this case, see notes 66-80 infra and accompanying text.
2. Id at 191.
3. Id at 188. See text accompanying note 76 infra.
4. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1976 & Supp. HI 1979).
5. 642 F.2d 492 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (en bane), cert. denied, 101 S.Ct. 1360 (1981). See notes
106-17 infra and accompanying text.
6. Using the term "the Kyne standard" is slightly misleading because the Kyne opinion did
not set forth a specific standard to guide lower courts. As a result lower courts have used various
parts of the Kyne holding, see text accompanying note 76 infra, as the Kyne standard. See, e.g.,
Rockford Redi-Mix Co. v. Zipp. 632 F.2d 30, 31 (7th Cir. 1980) (certification proceeding is reviewable only when a Board order exceeds its jurisdiction and is "contrary to a specific and unambiguous provision of the Act") (footnote omitted), cert. denied, 101 S.Ct. 1388 (1981); National
Maritime Union v. NLRB, 375 F. Supp. 421, 430 (E.D. Pa.) (statutory terms must be "sufficiently
'clear and mandatory' to confer jurisdiction"), aff'd 506 F.2d 1052 (3d Cir. 1974), cert.denied, 421
U.S. 963 (1975).
7. See text accompanying note 114 infra.
8. An example of a statutory mandate is section 9(c)(1) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(1)
(1976): "Ifthe Board finds... that.. . a question of representation exists, it shall direct an
election .. " (emphasis added).
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exercise considerable discretion under statutory mandates, 9 these provisions, unlike statutory prohibitions,o do not always command Board
action. Without clear guidelines courts may incorrectly construe statutory mandates and improperly assume jurisdiction under the Kyne
standard, thus infringing the Board's sphere of discretion."I This result
impedes the Board's ability to effectively resolve labor disputes. 12 Second, the Kyne standard fails to address the following, significant concern: the denial of district court jurisdiction can result in the absence of

judicial review of Board representation orders.13 Third, the Kyne standard does not indicate whether district court jurisdiction should be de-

nied to a party who could secure judicial review of a Board order in the
courts of appeals after the representation election has occurred.
The significance, in addition to the shortcomings, of the Kyne standard makes its examination worthwhile. Historically, employers, unions, and employees have invoked district court jurisdiction to disrupt
the representation process. 14 The Kyne standard determines the frequency of such interruptions, and therefore, in some cases, determines
the results of a representation election. As a jurisdictional standard
Kyne also determines the relative roles of the courts and the Board in

regulating the representation process. Because the Kyne standard is
used under numerous regulatory acts, 15 its significance as an allocating
9. See, e.g., Gould, Inc. v. Fuchs, 486 F. Supp. 164, 168 (D. Conn. 1980); National Maritime
Union v. NLRB, 375 F. Supp. 421, 432-34 (E.D. Pa.), a 'd 506 F.2d 1052 (3d Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 421 U.S. 963 (1975).
10. Statutory prohibitions forbid certain action. Section 9(b)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 159(b)(1) (1976),
for example, provides: "[Tihe Board shallnot ... decide that any unit [that includes both professional and nonprofessional employees] is appropriate [unless the] professional employees vote for
inclusion in such [a] unit ..
" (emphasis added).
11. See notes 96-101 infra and accompanying text.
12. Courts should interfere with Board action only if the Board acts clearly in excess of its
delegated powers. See NLRB v. Local 103, Int'l Assoc. of Bridge Workers, 434 U.S. 335, 350
(1978) (quoting NLRB v. Truck Drivers, 353 U.S. 87, 96 (1957)). Justice White, in Local 103,
explained the rationale underlying this proposition:
The Board's resolution of the conflicting claims in this case represents a defensible construction of the statute and is entitled to considerable deference. Courts may prefer a
different application of the relevant sections, but "[tihe function of striking that balance
to effectuate national labor policy is often a difficult and delicate responsibility, which
the Congress committed primarily to the National Labor Relations Board, subject to
limited judicial review."
434 U.S. at 350 (citations omitted).
13. See text accompanying notes 102-05 hina.
14. See notes 24-28 infra and accompanying text.
15. See, eg., Borden, Inc. v. FTC, 495 F.2d 785, 786-87 (7th Cir. 1974) (citing Kyne in support of the "well-settled" proposition that district courts should not interfere with agency action
unless the agency has clearly violated a right secured by a statute or regulation); United States v.
Feaster, 410 F.2d 1354, 1371 (5th Cir.) (applying Kyne to the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C.
§§ 151-200 (1976 & Supp. III 1979)), cert.denied, 396 U.S. 962 (1969); Elmo Division of Drive-X
Co. v. Dixon, 348 F.2d 342, 343-46 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C.
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mechanism between courts and administrative agencies is not limited
to the National Labor Relations Act.
This note first examines the Kyne standard and the reformulation
suggested in the Physicians dissent. The note then argues that the Kyne
test provides inadequate jurisdictional guidelines and that the reformulation proposed in Physicians does not effectively resolve these inadequacies. Finally, this note proposes a standard for determining when
district court jurisdiction should be exercised to review Board represen16
tation orders.
I.

THE REPRESENTATION PROCESS AND JUDICIAL REVIEW OF
REPRESENTATION ORDERS

A. Background.
Although courts have cited Leedom v. Kyne in various contexts,17
it is invoked most frequently when a union seeks to become the authorized bargaining representative for a group of employees.' 8 Section 9 of
§§ 41-47 (1976 & Supp. III 1979)); Marshall v. Nichols, 486 F. Supp. 615, 621 (E.D. Tex. 1980)
(Occupational Health and Safety Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1976)); M.G. Davis & Co. v. Cohen,
256 F. Supp. 128, 131 (S.D.N.Y.) (Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1976
& Supp. III 1979)), afrd, 369 F.2d 360 (2d Cir. 1966); Long Island R.R. v. United States, 193 F.
Supp. 795, 799-800 (E.D.N.Y. 1961) (Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C. §§ 1-40 (1976 & Supp.
III 1979)); ef. Associated Builders and Contractors, Inc. v. Irving, 610 F.2d 1221, 1227 (4th Cir.
1979) (Kyne standard applied in reviewing acts of General Counsel), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 965

(1980).
16. This note does not discuss whether district court jurisdiction under Kyne should be eliminated entirely. This judgment belongs to Congress. Nor does this note discuss an interesting
paradox: only two judicial forums, the courts of appeals and the Supreme Court, are available to
review unfair labor practice orders, see notes 35-40 infra and accompanying text; three judicial
forums, the district courts, the courts of appeals, and the Supreme Court, are available to review
Board representation orders that fall within the limits of Kyne. This result is especially surprising
in that Congress has expressly approved only judicial review of unfair labor practice orders. See
notes 24-32 infra and accompanying text. This note also does not discuss the relative merits of the
courts of appeals and the district courts as forums for the initial review of Board representation
orders.
17. See Cannery Warehousemen, Local 748 v. Haig Berberian, Inc., 623 F.2d 77 (9th Cir.
1980) (refusal by Board to defer to arbitrator's decision in determining coverage of collective
bargaining agreement); Terminal Freight Handling Co. v. Solien, 444 F.2d 699 (8th Cir. 1971)
(action to compel a regional director to seek an injunction against an alleged secondary boycott),
cer. denied, 405 U.S. 996 (1972); Machinery Employees, Local 714 v. Madden, 343 F.2d 497 (7th
Cir.) (action to enjoin an election to remove a union-shop authorization), cert. denied, 382 U.S.
822 (1965). See note 15 supra.
18. See, e.g., Rockford Redi-Mix Co. v. Zipp, 632 F.2d 30 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 101 S.
Ct. 1388 (1981); Chicago Truck Drivers v. NLRB, 599 F.2d 816 (7th Cir. 1979); McCulloch v.
Libbey-Owens-Ford Glass Co., 403 F.2d 916 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1016 (1969);
Greensboro Hosiery Mills, Inc. v. Johnston, 377 F.2d 28 (4th Cir. 1967); Local 1545, United Bhd.
of Carpenters v. Vincent, 286 F.2d 127 (2d Cir. 1960); National Maritime Union v. NLRB, 375 F.
Supp. 421 (E.D. Pa.), a~fd, 506 F.2d 1052 (3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 963 (1975).
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the National Labor Relations Act provides the statutory procedures for
selecting a bargaining representative.' 9 Under section 9(c)(1) either an
employer, a union, or an employee can file a petition requesting that
the Board hold a representation election. 20 The Board will investigate
this petition and hold a hearing if it has "reasonable cause to believe
that a question of representation affecting commerce exists."' 2 ' If the
evidence presented at the hearing demonstrates sufficient need, the
Board will conduct an election. Absent challenges to the propriety of
the election, the Board will certify the union receiving a majority of the
to bargain with the employer
votes cast.22 Certification entitles a union
23
electorate.
its
of
agent
as the exclusive
Provisions authorizing immediate judicial review of representation
orders are conspicuously absent from section 9 of the Act. This omission resulted from Congress's experience with the predecessor of section 9, Public Resolution 44.24 That statute permitted immediate
judicial review of representation orders in the courts of appeals. 25 By
frequently appealing pre-election orders, some employers used this re19. 29 U.S.C. § 159 (1976).
20. Id § 159(c)(1) (1976). Section 9(c)(1) provides in full:
Whenever a petition shall have been filed, in accordance with such regulations as
may be prescribed by the Board(A) by an employee or group of employees or any individual or labor organization acting in their behalf alleging that a substantial number
of employees (i) wish to be represented for collective bargaining and that
their employer declines to recognize their representative as the representative defined in [section 9(a)], or (ii) assert that the individual or labor organization, which has been certified or is being currently recognized by
their employer as the bargaining representative, is no longer a representative as defined in [section 9(a)]; or
(B) by an employer, alleging that one or more individuals or labor
organizations have presented to him a claim to be recognized as the representative defined in [section 9(a)];
the Board shall investigate such petition and if it has reasonable cause to believe that a
question of representation affecting commerce exists shall provide for an appropriate
hearing upon due notice. Such hearing may be conducted by an officer or employee of
the regional office, who shall not make any recommendations with respect thereto. If the
Board finds upon the record of such hearing that such a question of representation exists,
it shall direct an election by secret ballot and shall certify the results thereof.
An employer can also voluntarily recognize a union as the authorized bargaining representative for his employees. See R. GORMAN, LABOR LAW 40 (1976). Section 9 is inapplicable to
voluntary proceedings. See id
21. 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(1) (1976).
22. Certification represents official Board approval of a union as the bargaining representative for a group of employees. See generally GORMAN, supra note 20, at 40, 52-54. For a discussion of the importance of certification, see Cox, The MajorLabor Decisionsof the Supreme Court
October Term 1958, 1959 PROCEEDINGs A.B.A. SECTION OF LABOR REL. L. 36, reprintedin W.
GELLHORN & C. BysE, ADmiNISTRATVE LAW 447 (6th ed. 1974).
23. For a detailed discussion of the election process, see C. MoRuus, THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 153-266 (1971).

24. 48 Stat. 1183 (1934) (repealed 1935).
25. Id §2.
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view procedure to postpone representation elections indefinitely. 26 Because this practice was inimical to industrial peace,2 7 Congress
Act a provision allowing
purposefully omitted from section 9 of the
28
immediate access to the courts of appeals.
Section 10(f) of the Act 29 appears to authorize immediate judicial
review of representation orders in that it provides for immediate appellate review of all "final orders" issued by the Board.30 The Supreme
Court has held, however, that representation orders are not final orders
within the meaning of section 10(f). 31 The Court acknowledged that a
contrary holding would allow direct judicial intervention into the representation process and opined that this practice would subvert the
carefully circumscribed review provisions of section 9.32
Although section 10(f) does not provide for immediate judicial review of Board representation orders, judicial review of these orders can
be obtained indirectly under this section. 33 To obtain judicial review a

party must first provoke an unfair labor practice34 charge after a representation election has occurred. The most common method of provoking such a charge is to refuse to bargain over the proposed collective
agreement.35 After investigation of the charge, the Board issues either
an order to remedy the unfair labor practice or an order dismissing the
charge. 36 These orders are "final orders" within the meaning of section
26. See Goldberg, District Court Review of NLRB RepresentationProceedings, 42 IND. L.J.
455, 460 (1967).
27. The adverse effect on industrial peace resulting from the dilatory use of the courts was
noted in the Senate Report on the Wagner Act:
Under Public Resolution 44, any attempt by the government to conduct an election of
representatives may be contested ab initio in the courts, although such election is in reality merely a preliminary determination of fact. This means that the government can be
delayed indefinitely before it takes the first step toward industrial peace.
S. RFP. No. 573, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 5-6 (1935).
28. See note 128 infra.
29. 29 U.S.C. § 160(f) (1976). Section 10(f) provides:
Any person aggrieved by a final order of the Board granting or denying in whole or
in part the relief sought may obtain a review of such order in any United States court of
appeals in the circuit wherein the unfair labor practice in question was alleged to have
been engaged in or wherein such person resides or transacts business, or in the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, by filing in such a court a written
petition praying that the order of the Board be modified or set aside.
30. Id
31. See AFL v. NLRB, 308 U.S. 401, 412 (1940); NLRB v. IBEW, 308 U.S. 413, 414-15
(1940).
32. AFL v. NLRB, 308 U.S. 401, 408-12 (1940).
33. For further explanation of the section 10(f) method of review, see Goldberg, supra note
26, at 491.
34. An unfair labor practice is any action that violates section 8 of the Act. 29 U.S.C. § 158
(1976).
35. See Goldberg, supra note 26, at 491.
36. 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1976).
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10(f); 37

any party aggrieved by a final order is entitled to immediate
access to the courts of appeals.38 Because representation orders are reviewable incident to the review of an unfair labor practice order,39 the
appellate court can review the propriety of the Board's representation
orders when determining whether to enforce the Board's unfair labor
practice order.40
Generally, only employers will provoke an unfair labor practice
charge to gain judicial review because they have little to lose by delaying contract negotiations. A certified union usually will not delay the
bargaining process, for it has a vested interest in obtaining a collective
bargaining agreement. Moreover, if a certified union refuses to bargain, the employer might not file an unfair labor practice charge. The
union's refusal to bargain in this situation not only reduces the employees' confidence in the union's ability to negotiate a contract, but also
fails to produce judicial review of the Board's representation order.
Thus, section 10(f) does little to provide a certified union with a method
by which it can obtain judicial review of Board representation orders. 4 1
Section 8(b)(7)(B) of the Act theoretically provides an indirect
method of appellate review for a union that has recently lost a representation election. 42 This section declares that recognitional picketing,
37. See AFL v. NLRB, 308 U.S. 401, 409 (1940).
38. See note 29 supra.
39. The specific language authorizing this practice is found in section 9(d) of the Act, 29
U.S.C. § 159(d) (1976):
Whenever an [unfair labor practice] order of the Board... is based in whole or in
part upon facts certified following an investigation pursuant to [section 9(c)] ... and
there is a petition for the enforcement or review of such order, such certification and the
record of such investigation shall be included in the transcript of the entire record required to be filed under section 10(e) or 10(0, and thereupon the decree of the court
enforcing, modifying, or setting aside in whole or in part the order of the Board shall be
made and entered upon the pleadings, testimony, and proceedings set forth in such transcript.
See Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 146, 154 (1941); Goldberg, supra note 26, at
456-57.
40. The reason for the rather circuitous method of review provided by section 10(f) is explained by Gorman
The object of this [method of review] is to deter dilatory challenges in the midst of representation cases which will delay the conduct of an election and the prompt recording of
employee preferences on collective bargaining; moreover, the outcome of the election
will in many instances render moot the challenges to the Board representation findings.
GoRMAN, supra note 20, at 11.
41. For an example of when a certified union would seek judicial review under section 10(f),
see Leedom v. Kne, 358 U.S. 184, 186 (1958). Section 10(f) also may not provide interested third
parties with means to secure judicial review of Board representation orders. See Florida Bd. of
Business Regulation v. NLRB, 497 F. Supp. 599, 602 (M.D. Fla. 1980) (State of Florida, seeking
review of Board orders asserting jurisdiction over jai-alai industry, would not be able to secure
review under section 10(f) if jai-alai employer did not institute an unfair labor practice
proceeding).
42. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(7)(B) (1976).
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or the threat of such picketing, is an unfair labor practice when a valid
election has been conducted during the preceding twelve months.4 3 To

invoke this method of review, the union pickets the target employer for
recognition after losing the representation election. 44 If the employer
files a section 8(b)(7)(B) unfair labor practice charge against the union,
the Board investigates the charge and, if it deems appropriate, uses its
injunctive power under section 10(a) of the Act 45 to restrain the picketing. The issuance of an injunction results in "a reviewable 'final order
by the Board. . .' "which can be appealed immediately. 46 The propri-

ety of the certification proceeding is reviewed incident to this appeal.47
Courts have disagreed over whether section 8(b)(7)(B) presents a

practical method of post-election review. 48

Judge Lumbard of the

Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit found "no reason.., why
this approach would not provide an adequate vehicle for eventual review of the Board's determination." 49 The Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit, in NLRB v. Interstate Dress Carriers,Inc.,5o identified
three reasons that support a contrary conclusion. First, an employee
can be discharged for cause if he pickets in violation of section
8(b)(7)(B). 5 1 The employee therefore has little incentive to initiate the
section 8(b)(7)(B) review process. Further, a union that has recently
lost a representation election probably does not have the influence nec43. Id Section 8(b)(7)(B) provides:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents(7) to picket or cause to be picketed, or threaten to picket or cause to be picketed,
any employer where an object thereof is forcing or requiring an employer to recognize or
bargaii with a labor organization as the representative of his employees, or forcing or
requiring the employees of an employer to accept or select such labor organization as
their collective bargaining representative, unless such labor organization is currently certified as the representative of such employees:
(B) where within the preceding twelve months a valid election under section 9(c)
of this Act has been conducted ....
44. For a more complete discussion of the procedures necessary to invoke section 8(b)(7)(B),
see Goldberg, supra note 26, at 503-04.
45. 29 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1976). Section 10(a) empowers the Board "to prevent any person
from engaging in any unfair labor practice... affecting commerce."
46. United Fed'n of College Teachers, Local 1460 v. Miller, 479 F.2d 1074, 1079 (2d Cir.
1973) (quoting Herald Co. v. Vincent, 392 F.2d 354, 356 (2d Cir. 1968)).
47. See note 39 supra and accompanying text.
48. Compare Cannery Warehousemen, Local 748 v. Haig Berberian, Inc., 623 F.2d 77, 80-81
n.4 (9th Cir. 1980) and United Fed'n of College Teachers, Local 1460 v. Miller, 479 F.2d 1074,
1079 (2d Cir. 1973) (holding section 8(b)(7)(B) to be a feasible method of post-election review)
with NLRB v. Interstate Dress Carriers, Inc., 610 F.2d 99, 108-09 (3d Cir. 1979) (concluding that
the remedy under section 8(b)(7)(B) is too speculative to be considered realistically available).
49. United Fed'n of College Teachers, Local 1460 v. Miller, 479 F.2d 1074, 1079 (2d Cir.
1973).
50. 610 F.2d 99 (3d Cir. 1979).
51. Id at 109.
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essary to convince employees to disregard the risk of discharge. Second, it is the employer who must file the unfair labor practice charge
52
which enables the union to obtain access to the appellate courts.
Generally, an employer will file the unfair labor practice charge only if
he finds the picketing disruptive. 53 A union's ibility to secure judicial
review of Board representation orders under section 8(b)(7)(B) is thus
uncertain because it depends on the employer's assessment of the need
to enjoin the picketing. Third, courts probably will not countenance
disruptive picketing under section 8(b)(7)(B) because such picketing
contravenes that section's purpose: to limit disturbances of industrial
peace.54
The concerns enumerated in InterstateDress Carriersindicate that
section 8(b)(7)(B) is an impractical method of obtaining appellate review of representation orders. Under section 10(f) of the Act only employers are assured judicial review of Board representation orders. The
Act therefore allows judicial review of Board representation orders
only in limited circumstances: when an employer seeks such review in
the courts of appeals after the representation election has occurred.
B. The Fay, Kyne, and Sociedad Nacional Exceptions to Direct
JudicialIntervention in the RepresentationProcess.
Although the Act prohibits immediate appellate review of representation orders and limits post-election appellate review of these orders, it does not state whether district courts have jurisdiction to
immediately review representation orders. This issue was addressed in
a trio of cases, beginning with Fay v. Douds.55 In Fay Judge Learned
Hand proposed, in dicta, that district courts have jurisdiction to intervene in the representation process if a party's claim, in attempting to
establish that the Board deprived that party of a constitutional right, is
52. Id at 108-09.
53. Id

54. Id at 109.
55. 172 F.2d 720 (2d Cir. 1949). Fay involved a representation dispute between two unions.
Local 475, United Electrical Workers was the incumbent union. It was renegotiating its collective
bargaining agreement when the United Automobile Workers filed a petition for certification as

the exclusive bargaining representative of the employees that Local 475 represented. Because
Local 475 had not complied with sections 9(f), 9(g), and 9(h) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 159(0-(h)
(1976), it lacked status to object to the holding of a consent election. The Board therefore duly
ordered an election without holding any preliminary hearings. Local 475 lost the election and
sought relief in the district court, alleging the unconstitutional deprivation of its procedural due
process rights as a result of the Board's failure to conduct a formal hearing before the holding of

the election. 172 F.2d at 723.
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not "transparently frivolous.

' 56

Judge Hand intended the transpar-

ently frivolous limitation to allow district courts to deny jurisdiction
when a party merely disagreed with the manner in which the Board

conducted the representation proceeding. Notwithstanding this qualification, Fay possesses potentially enormous breadth. Because any argu-

able deprivation of due process rights meets its standard, Fay could
authorize unlimited district court jurisdiction. 57 This problem has led
several courts to question Fay.58 Other courts have modified the Fay

standard in an attempt to narrow its potential breadth.5 9 No modifica-

tion has been generally accepted by the courts, however, and it is highly

60
doubtful that Fay is still authoritative law.
A second ground for district court jurisdiction is found in McCul-

loch v. SociedadNacionalde Marineros de Honduras.6 1 In McCulloch

several seagoing vessels were beneficially owned by an American corporation, but were legally owned by the corporation's foreign subsidiary.62 The ships flew the flags of foreign nations and employed foreign
crews; foreign unions represented the crews. The Board nevertheless
56. 172 F.2d at 723. Judge Hand also stated in dicta that "having once acquired jurisdiction,
the [district] court might, and should, dispose of all other questions which arose, even though they
would not have been independently justiciable." Id This reasoning has not been adopted by any

court. For an enlightening analysis of this dicta, see Goldberg, supra note 26, at 466-69.
57. See Blue Cross & Blue Shield v. NLRB, 609 F.2d 240, 244 (6th Cir. 1979).

58. See, e.g., Amalgamated Meat Cutters, Local 576 v. Allen, 423 F.2d 267, 269 (8th Cir.
1970); Herald Co. v. Vincent, 392 F.2d 354, 359 (2d Cir. 1968); Greensboro Hosiery Mills, Inc. v.
Johnston, 377 F.2d 28, 32 (4th Cir. 1967); Boire v. Miami Herald Publishing Co., 343 F.2d 17, 21
n.7 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 824 (1965). But see Florida Bd. of Business Regulation v.
NLRB, 497 F. Supp. 599, 602 (M.D. Fla. 1980) (using Fay as an alternative ground for jurisdiction). The Supreme Court has never adopted the Fay standard.
59. A recurring, but not generally accepted, modification ofFay provides that the denial of a
substantial constitutional right is sufficient for district court jurisdiction. See Squillacote v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, Local 344, 561 F.2d 31, 37-39 (7th Cir. 1977) (because the "transparently frivolous" standard can be so easily satisfied, jurisdiction should only be granted when a
plain violation of a constitutional right is alleged); United Fed'n of College Teachers, Local 1460
v. Miller, 479 F.2d 1074, 1080 (2d Cir. 1973) (dissent) (violation of due process clause of fifth
amendment allows district court to grant jurisdiction under the Fay doctrine); McCormick v.
Hirsch, 460 F. Supp. 1337, 1347 (M.D. Pa. 1978) ("[W]hile mere allegations of constitutional deprivations may not be sufficient to vest jurisdiction in the District Court, a clearly colorable claim
...is sufficient to require the District Court to intervene to protect constitutional rights") (footnote omitted). But f Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Samoff, 365 F.2d 625, 628 (3d Cir. 1966)
("The question whether the Constitution [requires a pre-election hearing] is not of itself grounds
for jurisdiction in the district court").
60. A reformulation of Fay is not attempted in this note. A proper analysis of Fay would
require the determination of whether Congress can deny access to the federal court system even
though a party's due process rights have been violated by a regulatory agency. This question
arises if Fay is rejected as authoritative precedent, see note 58 supra, and the Board violates the
due process rights of an unsuccessful union.
61. 372 U.S. 10 (1963).
62. Id at 13.
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decided that the Act covered the foreign seamen and ordered a representation election 63 to determine their proper bargaining representative. The Board's assertion of jurisdiction aroused vigorous protests
from foreign governments. The United States District Court for the
District of Columbia exercised jurisdiction over the dispute and enjoined the Board from conducting the elections. 64 The Supreme Court
affirmed the district court's decision and indicated that jurisdiction is
properly exercised in "the presence of public questions particularly
high in the scale of our national interest because of their international
'65
complexion.
In Leedom v. Kyne 66 the Supreme Court developed a third ground
for district court jurisdiction to review Board representation orders. In
Kyne a labor organization petitioned the Board for certification as the
exclusive collective bargaining agent for the nonsupervisory professional employees of a Westinghouse Corporation plant. The Board
held a hearing on the petition. It concluded that the appropriate bargaining unit should include the 233 professional employees the union
desired to represent as well as nine nonprofessional employees. The
Board included the latter individuals in the bargaining unit because
they shared a "close community of employment interests" with the professional employees. 67 The union requested that the Board conduct an
election among the professional employees to determine if they favored
inclusion in a mixed bargaining unit. The Board refused to do so despite section 9(b)(1) of the Act,68 which provides that "the Board shall
not. . . decide that any unit is appropriate" if it includes both professional and nonprofessional employees unless "a majority of. . . [the]
professional employees vote [to be included] in such a unit."' 69 The
union was certified as the exclusive bargaining agent for the mixed
unit, but it brought an action in the district court to set aside the certification order because of the inclusion of the nonprofessional
70
employees.
63. Id at 13-14.
64. Empresa Hondurena De Vapores, S.A. v. McLeod, 200 F. Supp. 484 (S.D.N.Y. 1961),
rep'd 300 F.2d 222 (2d Cir. 1962), af'dsub nom., McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros
de Honduras, 372 U.S. 10 (1963).

65. 372 U.S. at 17. SociedadNacionalalso has significance in determining what activities are
sufficiently "in commerce" to be within the Board's jurisdiction. Id at 17-22. For other cases that
delineate the scope of the words "in commerce," see Incres Steamship Co. v. International Maritime Workers Union, 372 U.S. 24 (1963); Benz v. Compania Naviera Hidalgo, 353 U.S. 138
(1957).
66. 358 U.S. 184 (1958).
67. Id at 186.

68. 29 U.S.C. § 159(b)(1) (1976).
69. Id.
70. The Board later admitted that its refusal to conduct a vote among the professional em-
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The United States District Court for the District of Columbia held

that it had jurisdiction to grant the requested relief because the Board
lacked authority to disregard the "mandatory limitation" of section
9(b)(1). 71 The district court also concluded that the Board's refusal to
conduct the required election caused irreparable damage to the right
afforded professional employees by section 9(b)(1). 72 The Court of Ap-

peals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed. 73 The court of appeals held that the Board's action violated a statutory provision
"intended to protect.

. .

professionals; that the professionals' right" to

the benefit provided by the statute did "not depend on Board discretion
or expertise; and that denial of [the right resulted] in injury. 74
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals. 75
The majority based its conclusion on the unauthorized nature of the
Board's action:
This suit.

. .

is one to strike down an order of the Board made in

excess of its delegated powers and contrary to a specific prohibition

in the act. Section 9(b)(1) is clear and mandatory. . . . [T]he Board
. ..attempted [an] exercise of power that had been specifically withheld. It deprived the professional employees of a "right" assured to
them by Congress. Surely, in these circumstances, a Federal District
Court has jurisdiction
of an original suit to prevent deprivation of a
76
right so given.

The majority rejected the Board's argument that jurisdiction

should be denied because Congress created no express remedy to redress violations of section 9(b)(1). The Court observed that section
9(b)(1) was stated in prohibitory.terms and held that Congress intended
that statutory prohibitions, which are definite in meaning, be judicially
enforced. The court contrasted statutory language cast in prohibitory
terms and statutory language expressed as a mandate:
While an affirmative declaration of duty contained in a legislative
enactment may be of imperfect obligation because not enforceable in
terms, a definite statutory prohibition of conduct which would thwart
ployees did violate a specific prohibition in the Act. 358 U.S. at 187. Limiting the Kyne holding

to its facts, however, would permit the Board to evade judicial review simply by not admitting to
its wrongdoing. See National Maritime Union v. NLRB, 375 F. Supp. 421, 430 (E.D. Pa.), a7'd,
506 F.2d 1052 (3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 963 (1975).
71. Kyne v. Leedom, 148 F. Supp. 597, 601 (D.D.C. 1956), af'd, 249 F.2d 490 (D.C. Cir.

1957), aft'd, 358 U.S. 184 (1958).
72. 148 F. Supp. at 601.
73. Leedom v. Kyne, 249 F.2d 490 (D.C. Cir. 1957), a'd,

74. 249 F.2d at 491.
75. Leedom v. Kyne, 358 U.S. 184 (1958).

76. Id at 188-89.

358 U.S. 184 (1958).

864
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the declared purpose of the legislation cannot be disregarded ...
The definite prohibition which Congress inserted in the Act can not
therefore be overriden in the view that Congress intended it to be
77
ignored.

Finally, the Court distinguished Switchmen's Union v. National
MediationBoard.78 In Switchmen's Union the Court held that a district

court did not have jurisdiction to review a representation order issued
by the National Mediation Board (NMB) because the NMB had acted
within its statutory powers. 79 The Kyne Court stated that in Switch-

men's Union no congressionally created right could have been violated
by the denial of district court jurisdiction because the NMB had not
violated any statutory constraint. In Kyne, however, the Court reasoned that foreclosing jurisdiction would have allowed the Board to
deny professional employees their section 9(b)(1) rights. The Court
reached this conclusion because the professional employees in Kyne
had "no other means within their control.
these rights.8 0

. .

to protect and enforce"

The Kyne opinion left three questions unanswered. First, the
Kyne majority did not indicate whether district courts may exercise jurisdiction in cases involving alleged Board violations of provisions of
the Act cast in mandatory language. Second, the significance of the
following concern is unclear: the denial of district court jurisdiction
can insulate Board representation orders from judicial review. Third,
the Kyne Court never addressed the issue of whether district court ju77. Id at 189.
78. 320 U.S. 297 (1942).
79. Id at 300.
80. 358 U.S. at 190. Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Frankfurter, dissented in Kne. Justice Brennan concluded that nothing in the Act or its legislative history indicated that Congress
intended the representation process to be interrupted by judicial review of Board orders, even
when the order was based on an alleged misinterpretation of the Act. Id at 191-95. He asserted
that the majority's decision opened "a gaping hole in [the] congressional wall against direct resort
to the courts" because any party alleging unlawful Board action could bring a case immediately in
a district court. Id at 914.
Justice Brennan also contended that the Court's reliance on Switchmen's Union was misplaced. He argued that Switchmen's Union held merely that access to the district courts should be
allowed when Congress creates a right without creating a tribunal for its enforcement. Congress
created the Board specifically to protect the rights embodied in the Act. Thus there was no reason
to allow jurisdiction in Kyne. Id at 197-201. Justice Brennan stated that any inequity in the
procedure resulted from the congressional decision that the need to prevent the disruption of the
representation process outweighed the hardship that might result from the absence of judicial
review. Id at 197.
For further analysis of the Kyne opinion, see Goldberg, supra note 26, at 470-90; Comment,
JudicialReview ofreliminary OrdersofNationalAdministrativeAgencies 4fter Leedom v. Kyne, 8
BUFFALO L. Rav. 372 (1959); 73 HARv. L. REv. 217 (1959); 57 MICH. L. Rav. 910 (1959).
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risdiction should be denied to a party who could secure judicial review
of Board representation orders after the representation election.
II.

EXTENSIONS OF LEEDOM v. KYNE

A. Early Extensions.
The first decision8 l to apply the yne standard to alleged Board
violations of statutory mandates was Miami Newspaper PrintingPressman's Local 46 v. McCulloch 82 In Miami Newspaper the Board conducted a representation election and then set it aside because of an
infirmity in its own procedure. After conducting a subsequent hearing,
the Board affirmed the validity of the original election. Rather than
reinstating the initial results, however, the Board ordered the regional
81. Before the Kyne test was applied to statutory mandates, the Court modified the standard
in Boire v. Greyhound Corp., 376 U.S. 473 (1964). In Boire the Board determined that Greyhound Corporation and Floors Corporation were joint employers of a group of bus-terminal
maintenance employees and that the unit consisting of all employees under the joint-employer
relationship was the appropriate unit for a representation election. Id at 475. Greyhound disagreed and filed suit in district court to set aside the Board's decision and enjoin the election. The
district court exercised jurisdiction on the basis of Kwe and granted the injunction, concluding
that the Board's findings were legally insufficient to establish a joint-employer relationship. Greyhound Corp. v. Boire, 205 F. Supp. 686 (S.D. Fla.), afl'd, 309 F.2d 397 (5th Cir. 1962), rev'd, 376
U.S. 473 (1964). The court of appeals affirmed. Boire v. Greyhound Corp., 309 F.2d 397 (5th Cir.
1962), rev'd, 376 U.S. 473 (1964). The Supreme Court reversed the decisions of the lower courts,
categorizing the joint-employer issue as "essentially... factual" and holding that Kyne is limited
to questions that depend solely on the construction of the Act. 376 U.S. at 481-82.
Boire substantially limits the ambit of Kyne and usefully allocates matters between the Board
and the courts when the distinction between law and fact is clear. Often, however, the issue
presented involves inseparable questions of statutory interpretation and fact. For example, in
McCormick v. Hirsch, 460 F. Supp. 1337 (M.D. Pa. 1978), a union filed a representation petition
with the Board. It sought certification as the exclusive bargaining representative of teachers employed at a parochial high school. The Board began an investigation to determine if a representation hearing was necessary. Upon the scheduling of a hearing by the Board, the superintendent of
the school system fied suit in the district court. He requested a temporary restraining order and
an injunction, contending that the Act, as applied, violated his religious liberties guaranteed by
the first amendment. Id at 1340.
In determining whether to exercise jurisdiction, the court in McCormick faced inseparable
questions of fact and statutory interpretation: the court had to decide whether a parochial school
was an employer within the meaning of section 2(2) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (1976), and
whether Congress intended the Act to extend to religious institutions. After examining the language of the Act and its legislative history, the court granted jurisdiction on the basis of Kyne.
The court held that the Board "would be acting beyond the grant of power given by Congress in
the Act" if it were allowed to conduct representation proceedings involving parochial schools. 460
F. Supp. at 1345.
The court in McCormick did not rely on Boire in reaching its decision. Because of the inextricable nature of the questions of law and fact presented, Boire could not have aided the court in
its jurisdictional determinations. But see Grutka v. Barbour, 549 F.2d 5, 8 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
431 U.S. 908 (1977) (court rejected arguments that the "matter of law/matter of fact distinction
. . . is an overly facile solution to the problem of when district court jurisdiction is appropriate").
82. 322 F.2d 993 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
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director to conduct a second election, whereupon a union filed suit in
the district court to compel the Board to certify the results of the first
election. The union contended that because the original election was
found to have been properly conducted, the Board was required to affirm its validity pursuant to section 9(c)(1) 83 of the Act. The relevant
portion of that section provides: "If the Board finds. . . that. . . a

question of representation exists, it shall direct an election by secret
ballot and shall certify the results thereof."' 84 In holding that the Kyne
standard applied to the statutory mandate found in section 9(c)(1), the
court reasoned that a "party would be as aggrieved by [a failure of the
Board to act pursuant to a statutory mandate] as by an act of the Board
85
contrary to an express prohibition [of the Act]."

The Miami Newspaper decision is important because many of the
provisions of the Act that regulate the representation process are cast in
mandatory language. 86 Miami Newspaper complicates the judicial inquiry required under Kyne because more extensive analysis is often
necessary to determine whether a statutory mandate, as opposed to a
statutory prohibition, confers district court jurisdiction. Statutory
prohibitions are absolute; a court can determine if the Board has violated a prohibitory provision of the Act merely by examining the face
of the Act.87 In contrast, courts frequently must look beyond the face
of the Act to ascertain whether a statutory mandate confers district
court jurisdiction, for Congress and the courts88 have allowed the Board
to exercise discretion under these provisions.
An example of a statutory mandate that provides for Board discretion is section 9(c)(1) of the Act.8 9 It states that if "the Board finds...
that.

. .

a question of representation exists, it shall direct an election

• ..andshall certify the results thereof."90 The Board may exercise its
83. 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(1) (1976). For the text of this section, see note 20 supra.
84. Id (emphasis added).
85. 322 F.2d at 977. Since Miami Newspaper, courts frequently have applied Kyne to
mandatory provisions of the Act. See, ag., Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v.
NLRB, 633 F.2d 1079 (4th Cir. 1980) (section 9(c)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(1) (1976)); Surrat v.

NLRB, 463 F.2d 378 (5th Cir. 1972) (section 9(c)(1)); Templeton v. Dixie Color Printing Co., 444
F.2d 1064, 1069 (5th Cir. 1971) (section 9(c)(1)); Bullard Co. v. NLRB, 253 F. Supp. 391 (D.D.C.

1966) (section 9(e), 29 U.S.C. § 159(e) (1976)).
86. See 29 U.S.C. § 159 (1976). See generally Cox, The Major Labor Decisions of the
Supreme Court October Term 1958, 1959 PROCEEDINas OF A.B.A. SECTION OF LABOR REL. L. 23,
reprintedin W. GELLHORN & C. BysE, ADMINISmTRATIvE LAW 441 (6th ed. 1974). See note 20

supra.
87. See Leedom v. Kyne, 358 U.S. 184, 189 (1958) (quoting Texas & N.O.R. v. Brotherhood
of Ry. & S.S. Clerks, 281 U.S. 548, 568-69 (1930)). See text accompanying note 77 supra.

88. See note 9 supra.
89. 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(1) (1976). See note 20 supra.
90. 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(1) (1976) (emphasis added).
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discretion under section 9(c)(1) to prevent the holding of a representation election by applying the contract-bar doctrine. 9' The Board can
also decline to exercise jurisdiction under section 9(c)(1) when statutory
jurisdiction exists if it determines that the assertion of jurisdiction
would not further the purposes of the Act.92 To avoid infringement on
the Board's discretion, 93 therefore, a jurisdictional standard must adequately focus the court's attention on whether a statutory mandate
commands immediate Board action.
The Kyne standard, which prohibits Board action taken "in excess
of its delegated powers and contrary to a statutory prohibition," 94 provides little guidance for determining jurisdiction in cases involving alleged violations of statutory mandates. 95 This inadequacy of the Kyne
test is illustrated by Templeton v.Dixie ColorPrintingCo. 96 In Templeton the Board used one of its discretionary tools, the blocking-charge
doctrine, 97 to hold an employee decertification petition in abeyance for
over three years. 98 Four employees filed suit to compel the Board to
investigate the petition. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, in
affirming the district court's exercise of jurisdiction under Kyne, held
that the Board's refusal to take notice of the petition was arbitrary and
91. The contract-bar doctrine is a discretionary tool that permits the Board to dismiss an
election petition filed within either the first three years or the duration of a collective bargaining
agreement, whichever is less. See GORMAN, supra note 20, at 54-59.
92. See NLRB v. Denver Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 341 U.S. 675, 684 (1951); National
Maritime Union v. NLRB, 375 F. Supp. 421, 433 (E.D. Pa.), aft'd, 506 F.2d 1052 (3d Cir. 1974),
cert. denied, 421 U.S. 963 (1975); Council 19, Am. Fed'n of State Employees v. NLRB, 296 F.
1968).
Supp. 1100, 1104 (N.D. Ill.
93. See notes 11-12 supra and accompanying text.
94. Leedom v. Kyne, 358 U.S. 184, 188 (1958). See text accompanying note 76 supra.
95. The inability of the Kyne standard to provide useful jurisdictional guidelines has led
several courts to reformulate the standard. See Squillacote v. International Bhd. of Teamsters,
Local 344, 561 F.2d 31, 39 (7th Cir. 1977) (Kyne applies only to a plain violation of a statutory or
constitutional right); Uyeda v. Brooks, 365 F.2d 326, 331 (6th Cir. 1966) (procedural provisions of
the Act cannot be read as prohibitions limiting the Board's power under Kyne); Newport News
Shipbuilding & Drydock Co. v. NLRB, 498 F. Supp. 267,271 (E.D. Va. 1980) (Kyne authorizes an
"arbitrary and capricious" standard of review); National Maritime Union v. NLRB, 375 F. Supp.
421, 429-30 (E.D. Pa.) (district courts should apply an ad hoc test to determine if the provision
under scrutiny is sufficiently "clear and mandatory" to confer jurisdiction), atd, 506 F.2d 1052
(3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 963 (1975); accord, United States v. Feaster, 410 F.2d 1354,
1368 (5th Cir.) (Kyne permits access to the district courts under the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C.
§§ 151-188 (1976), "only if the Mediation Board's determination is infused with error which is of a
summa or magna quality as contraposed to decisions which are simply cum error"), cert. denied,
396 U.S. 962 (1969).
96. 444 F.2d 1064 (5th Cir. 1971).
97. The blocking-charge doctrine allows the Board to refuse to conduct a representation election if unfair labor practice charges are pending before it. See id at 1065.
98. The Board delayed investigation of the decertification petition for over three years because both the employer and the incumbent union had filed numerous unfair labor practice
charges. Id at 1066.
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contrary to the specific mandate of section 9(c)(1). 9 9 Emphasizing that

no adequate administrative relief was available to the plaintiffs, 00 the
court ordered the Board to investigate the decertification petition.
Because the jurisdictional standard used in Templeton did not adequately account for Board discretion, the court failed to consider fully
the nature of the Board action. Had the standard focused the court's
attention on this consideration, the unwarranted judicial interference
that occurred in Templeton might have been avoided. This infringement on the Board's discretion frustrated an underlying policy of the
Act: to rely on the Board's administrative expertise to resolve labor
disputes. 01
The Templeton decision also illustrates a second shortcoming of
the Kyne standard: Kyne's failure to indicate the significance to be attached to a party's ability to secure judicial or administrative review of
a Board order if district court jurisdiction is denied. In Templeton the
court took notice of the unavailability of an effective administrative
remedy.10 2 Other courts have suggested that district court jurisdiction
should be predicated on the absence of alternative forms of judicial or
administrative relief.103

Resolution of this question is important. For some parties, such as
unsuccessful unions, the district courts represent the only avenue of access to the judiciary. 104 The dissent in PhysiciansNationalHouse Staff
Association v. Fanning0 5 recognized the importance of considering the
disparity between parties' abilities to secure judicial review of Board
representation orders. The dissent therefore reformulated the Kyne
standard in an attempt to render it more useful.
B. The Physicians Standard.
In Physicians National House Staff Association v. Fanning106 an
99. Id at 1068-70. For the text of section 9(c)(1), see note 20 supra.
100. 444 F.2d at 1069.
101. See Meltzer, The Supreme Court, Congress,and State Jurisdictionover Labor Relations:

11, 59 COLuM. L. REv. 269, 299 (1959). Meltzer explains how repeated district court intervention
would result in the subjugation of the Board's delegated powers to conduct representation
elections:
[I]ndirect judicial control over the Board's [representation] machinery. . . would either
bring the Board and the courts into direct conflict in which courts, by virtue of their
broad equity powers, would prevail, or it would subordinate Board action to judicial
determinations in an area which demands all of the special insights and expertise inputed to the Board.
102. 444 F.2d at 1069.
103. See note 147 infra.
104. See notes 42-54 supra and accompanying text.
105. 642 F.2d 492 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (en banc), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 1360 (1981).
106. Id

Vol. 1981:853]

LEEDOM v. KYNE

employee association sought to organize the house staff of several hos-

pitals. House staff are physicians who serve as interns, residents, and
clinical fellows. The Board had determined that house staff were not

employees within the meaning of section 2(3) of the Act. 10 7 The Board
therefore refused to conduct representation elections at the various hospitals. The employee association sought relief in the district court, con-

tending that both section 2(3) of the Act and the legislative history
accompanying the 1974 amendments to the Act 0 8 provide a clear man-

date to the Board to classify house staff as employees. 0 9
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, sitting
en banc, refused to grant jurisdiction under Kyne. 110 The majority
found no statutory mandate on the face of section 2(3). Rather, the

court considered the determination of whether house staff are employees to be essentially a factual question and therefore beyond the jurisdiction of the district court:
The appellants attempt to find in section 2(3) of the Act ... the clear
statutory mandate required by Leedom v. Kyne. We think the attempt fails. That section does not define the term employee nor does
any other section of the Act. Whether a particular individual is an
employee depends upon the facts. The task of decision on the facts
of each case is assigned to the National Labor Relations Board and
in making that decision the Board exercises its informed
discretion. 1
107. See Cedars-Sinai Medical Center, 223 N.L.R.B. 251 (1976). Section 2(3), 29 U.S.C.
§ 152(3) (1976), provides in part:
The term "employee" shall include any employee, and shall not be limited to the employees of a particular employer.. . and shall include any individual whose work has

ceased as a consequence of, or in connection with, any current labor dispute or because
of any unfair labor practice, and who has not obtained any other regular and substan-

tially equivalent employment ...

108. The 1974 amendments to the Act removed the exemption for non-profit hospitals from
the definition of employer. See Pub. L. No. 93-360, 88 Stat. 395 (1974).
109. 642 F.2d at 494.

110. Id. at 500. The district court had held that it lacked jurisdiction to review the Board's
order because the question of whether the house staff were employees was "primarily a factual
and definitional determination of the type traditionally left to the discretion of the Board." Physicians Nat'l House Staff Ass'n v. Murphy, 443 F. Supp. 806, 810 (D.D.C. 1978), af'dsub non.,
Physicians Nat'l House Staff Ass'n v. Fanning, 642 F.2d 492 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (en banc), cert.
denied, 101 S. Ct. 1360 (1981). On appeal, Chief Judge Wright proposed a reformulation of the
Kyne standard and concluded that under the reformulation the district court should have exercised jurisdiction. Physicians Nat'l House Staff Ass'n v. Murphy, 100 L.R.R.M. 3055 (D.C. Cir.
Apr. 2), vacatedpendingrehearingen banc, 104 L.R.RM. 2592 (D.C. Cir. June 5, 1979). In reaching this conclusion he emphasized the affirmative congressional intent to classify house staff as
employees within the meaning of section 2(3) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1976), and the absence of any feasible recourse to the judiciary other than through the exercise of district court
jurisdiction. See 100 L.R.R.M. at 3060,3062. In the en banc decision, Chief Judge Wright lost his
majority and restated his proposed standard in his dissent. Physicians Nat'l House Staff Ass'n v.
Fanning, 642 F.2d 492 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (en banc), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 1360 (1981). See notes
114-117 infra and accompanying text.
111. 642 F.2d at 496 (footnote omitted).
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The court rejected the contention that the legislative history of the Act
provides the statutory mandate necessary to grant jurisdiction under
Kyne. It found no evidence that Congress intended house staff to be
classified as employees.112 Finally, the court was unpersuaded by the
argument that if jurisdiction were denied, the Board's order excluding
house staff from the coverage of the Act would never be subject to judicial review. The majority emphasized that Congress had considered
this hardship but had determined that the need for timely representa113
tion elections overrode this concern.
Chief Judge Wright, in his dissent, concluded that no meaningful
jurisdictional determination could be made without a more precise
standard. He identified four considerations relevant to the determination of jurisdiction under Kyne:
(A) whether the alleged error by the Board involved a question of
statutory interpretation or merely an issue of fact; (B) whether the
statutory provision is "clear and mandatory" in creating rights for
those subject to the NLRA; (C) whether the party challenging the
Board's action has a realistic hope of eventual court review following
an unfair labor practice order; and (D) the potential for thwarting
which would flow from finding jurisdicthe purposes of the11NLRA
4
tion in [each] case.
Chief Judge Wright concluded that jurisdiction existed in Physicians in
light of these considerations. Contrary to the majority, he found a clear
congressional intent in the legislative history of the Act to categorize
house staff as employees.1 5 He also noted the association's inability to
secure subsequent judicial review if jurisdiction were denied. 1 6 He
concluded by arguing that because the house staff were excluded from
the coverage of the Act, a grant of district court jurisdiction could not
possibly delay the collective bargaining process, for no representation
17
election was being conducted."
The dissent's test recognizes the need to formulate an effective jurisdictional standard. Such a standard must provide guidelines to aid
courts in analyzing statutory mandates and must indicate clearly the
112. Id at 497-99.

113. Id at 499.
114. Id at 503. Chief Judge Wright admitted that his standard requires at least a partial
examination of the merits to determine jurisdiction. Id n.21. He felt this commingling was necessary, however, to "preserve the policy of holding the courthouse door not 'wholly closed,' yet also
not 'widely ajar."' Id (quoting Local 130, Int'l Union of Electrical Workers v. McCulloch, 345
F.2d 90, 97 (D.C. Cir. 1965)).
115. 642 F.2d at 503-06.
116. Id at 512.
117. Id at 513.
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jurisdictional significance of alternative forms of review. The dissent's

test, however, does not successfully accomplish this task. Inquiring
whether an alleged Board error involves a question of fact or statutory

construction will properly allocate matters between the Board and the
courts when the distinction between law and fact is clear." 8 In cases

that involve inseparable questions of statutory interpretation and
fact,"19 however, this distinction provides little useful guidance. Arguably, such a test tends to narrow unduly the focus of a court and to

obfuscate the main issues of a case.' 20 The usefulness of the fact-law
distinction as part of a jurisdictional standard therefore is limited.

Assessing whether a statutory provision is "clear and mandatory"
in creating rights for those subject to the Act also poses several difficul-

ties as a jurisdictional inquiry. First, requiring a statutory provision to
be clear is meaningless: the term clear does not distinguish statutory
provisions of the Act.' 2 ' Second, the clear and mandatory standard

provides imprecise guidance, for it does not aid a court in determining
when to grant jurisdiction under statutory mandates. Third, this part

of the dissent's test apparently allows a court's jurisdictional analysis to
extend beyond the face of the Act to legislative history, 22 but it does
not state whether courts should consider in their jurisdictional inquiry
accepted Board practices that are not specifically approved in the Act
or its legislative history. 2 3 Fourth, if a statutory provision is ambiguous and examination of legislative history is permissible, the standard
reaches a paradoxical result: an ambiguous statute is classified as clear

and mandatory.

24

The imprecision of the clear and mandatory stan-

dard thus may lead to arbitrary jurisdictional determinations.
118. See note 81 supra.
119. See McCormick v. Hirsch, 460 F. Supp. 1337 (M.D. Pa. 1978) (inseparable question of
fact-is a parochial school an employer within meaning of section 2(2) of the Act, 29 U.S.C.
§ 152(2) (1976)-and statutory interpretation--did Congress intend the Act to extend to religious
institutions). See note 81 supra.
120. See Grutka v. Barbour, 549 F.2d 5, 9 (7th Cir.), cer. denied, 431 U.S. 908 (1977) (distinction between matters of law and fact required administrative adjudication of constitutional issues).
121. See Note, Labor Law: Direct JudicialReview of NLRB Election Orders, 66 COLUM. L.
REv. 1546, 1551 (1966) (the difference between a clear violation of a statutory provision and any
other type of a violation is illusory); cf Local 1545, United Bhd. of Carpenters v. Vincent, 286
F.2d 127, 133 (2d Cir. 1960) ("To be sure, the distinction between violation of a clear and of a not
so clear statutory command is neither completely satisfying nor. . . readily applied").
This argument assumes the term "clear" has independent meaning in this part of the jurisdictional standard.
122. One commentator suggested that legislative history must contain "an express statement
...
addressing the issue involved" to satisfy the second part of the standard proposed by the
Physicians dissent. See 56 NOTRE DAME LAW. 315, 323-24 (1980).
123. Such practices include the contract-bar doctrine, see note 91 supra, and the blockingcharge policy, see note 97 supra.
124. See 56 NOTRE DAME LAW. 315, 323-24 (1980).
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The third element of the dissent's test regulates the timing of judicial review based on a party's ability to secure post-election access to
the courts. If a party is unable to obtain judicial review by committing
an unfair labor practice, this element allows for immediate review of
representation orders. 125 All parties except employers can meet this rethe only effective means
quirement because the district courts represent
26
of access to the judiciary for these parties.
Initially, it would appear inappropriate to consider in a jurisdictional standard the disparity in ability to secure later judicial review of
Board orders. Congress rejected arguments premised on this consideration 127 in disapproving an amendment to the Taft-Hartley Act.' 28
Congress rejected these arguments, however, because the proposed
amendment would have allowed immediate review of all Board representation orders, thus enabling parties to delay indefinitely a representation election by appealing these orders. 29 Congress chose to prevent
this practice because of the need to ensure an uninterrupted representation process. 30 It is therefore consistent with Congress's intent to inquire about alternative means of judicial access in a jurisdictional
standard if the standard does not allow parties to delay indefinitely a
representation election.
Chief Judge Wright's test does not allow such dilatory tactics. The
third part of the standard authorizes immediate judicial review of
Board orders only for parties with no other means of access to the
courts. Further, these parties must meet the other requirements of the
dissent's four-part test before jurisdiction will be granted. The possible
dilatory use of district court jurisdiction could be reduced further, however, by denying pre-election judicial relief to parties able to secure
125. See Physicians Nat'l House StaffAss'n v. Fanning, 642 F.2d 492, 512 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (en
banc), cert. denied, 101 S.Ct. 1360 (1981).
126. See notes 33-54 supra and accompanying text.
127. An argument made in favor of the amendment was that unless it was passed, some parties
would be unable to secure judicial review of Board orders. See 93 CONo. REC. 6444 (1947) (remarks of Sen. Taft).
128. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 56-57 (1947). Judge Robb, writing
for the majority in Physicians Nat'l House Staff Ass'n v. Fanning, 642 F.2d 492 (D.C. Cir. 1980)
(en banc), cer. denied, 101 S. Ct. 1360 (1981) summarized the congressional hearings:

When it passed the Taft-Hartley Act, Congress considered an amendment which
would have allowed immediate review of Board certification decisions. This proposal
was included in the House version of the bill. . . . The provision was eliminated in
conference.... Senator Taft explained this action by commenting that the proposal
"would permit dilatory tactics in representation proceedings."

Id at 499 (citations omitted).
129. See notes 24-28 supra and accompanying text.
130. See 93 CONG. REC. 6444 (1947) (remarks of Sen. Taft).
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effective post-election review by committing an unfair labor practice. 13 1
Precluding these parties from pre-election relief imposes additional
costs on them,' 32 but the concomitant benefit of significantly reducing
33
interruptions in the representation process outweighs this hardship.
Notwithstanding its apparent benefits, this additional jurisdictional requirement is not included in the third part of the dissent's standard.
Another aspect of the timing of judicial review not considered by
the dissent's test is whether parties must exhaust their administrative
remedies before seeking district court relief. Requiring exhaustion of
administrative remedies would allow the Board to conserve judicial
time because of the structure of the Act's administrative review process.
Under section 3(b) of the Act 134 a regional director is delegated all
powers of initial decisionmaking. Parties to a representation proceeding can appeal his decisions to the Board. The Board then reviews the
director's decisions if "compelling reasons" exist.' 35 Because these
same reasons can provide grounds for district court jurisdiction, requiring the exhaustion of administrative remedies allows the Board the opportunity to correct errors made by the regional director before the
courts become involved.
The final element of Chief Judge Wright's test, which requires
courts to determine whether the purposes of the Act will be thwarted by
a court's exercise ofjurisdiction, 3 6 is unnecessary. If a court concludes
131. See notes 33-54 supra and accompanying text.
132. These costs arise from the necessity of a second representation campaign and from the
decreased efficiency of operations resulting from workers focusing their attention on another election rather than on their work. See Goldberg, supra note 26, at 497-98. These costs, however, are
arguably negligible. Because suits to enjoin representation elections usually are brought when the
election campaign is almost over, employers incur nearly identical representation campaign costs
and decreases in productivity whether or not they can secure pre-election relief. See, e.g., Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Samoff, 365 F.2d 625, 626 (3d Cir. 1966). Further, pre-election suits
brought by the employer can intensify employee interest in the representation election; this interest can cause a greater decrease in work productivity than would employee interest in a judicially
ordered second representation election. See Goldberg, supra note 26, at 497.
133. Pre-election interruptions would be significantly reduced because the suggested jurisdictional requirement bars employers from pre-election relief, and employers have historically
brought most pre-election suits. See Goldberg, supra note 26, at 493 n. 114 (of the first 67 cases
reported involving Kyne, 43 were filed by employers).
134. 29 U.S.C. § 153(b) (1976).
135. The "compelling reasons" are: (I) that a substantial question of law or policy is raised
because of (i) the absence of, or (ii) a departure from, officially reported Board precedent; (2) that
the regional director's decision on a substantial factual issue is clearly erroneous on the record and
such error prejudices the rights of a party; (3) that the conduct of the hearing or any ruling made
in connection with the proceeding has resulted in prejudicial error; and (4) that there are compelling reasons for reconsideration of an important Board rule or policy. 29 C.F.R. § 102.67(c)
(1980).
136. If this part of the standard is intended to instruct courts when to deny pre-election jurisdiction, it is too vague to provide useful guidance.
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that the second part of the test is satisfied-that the Board acted in
excess of its delegated powers-it is unlikely a court would conclude
that the fourth part of the standard is met. If a court did find the last
part of the test satisfied in this situation, 137 it is probable the court
would nevertheless grant jurisdiction. The violation of a clear and
mandatory statutory provision seems to be a more substantial ground
for jurisdiction than the contravention of a general purpose of the Act.
The fourth part of Chief Judge Wright's test also allows courts substantial discretion in interpreting the purposes of the Act, for the purposes
are broadly defined. 138 The final part of the dissent's test is therefore
subject to multifarious interpretations and does not provide precise jurisdictional guidance.
Although the Physicians dissent attempted to improve the Kyne
standard, its proposed test does not adequately aid a district court in
determining whether to exercise original jurisdiction over an alleged
violation of a statutory mandate. The dissent's emphasis on whether
the Board has violated a clear and mandatory statutory provision detracts from the crucial inquiry of whether the Board has acted pursuant
to its discretionary authority. Chief Judge Wright's test does focus a
court's inquiry on the important question of a party's ability to secure
judicial review of Board representation orders by committing an unfair
labor practice. Yet the dissent's standard leaves unresolved two issues
related to the timing of judicial review: whether a party able to secure
post-election review should be denied district court jurisdiction before
the election and whether a party must exhaust his administrative remedies before seeking district court relief. Although the dissent's test illustrates the need for a reformulation of the Kyne standard, it fails to
resolve important questions that the Kyne exception raises.
C. A ProposedStandard.
A jurisdictional standard designed to replace the Kyne test should
clearly identify circumstances in which district courts may exercise
137. A court could find both the second and fourth parts of the test satisfied if a specific

statutory provision conflicted with a purpose of the Act. See Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry
Dock Co. v. NLRB, 633 F.2d 1079, 1082-83 (4th Cir. 1980) (section 7 purposes of employee free

choice and majority rule, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976), conflicted with section 9(c)(l) duty to investigate
a decertification petition, 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(1) (1976)).
138. The Act states in section (1):
It is hereby declared ... [to encourage] the practice and procedure of collective
bargaining and [to protect] the exercise by workers of full freedom of association, self-

organization, and designation of representatives of their own choosing, for the purpose
of negotiating the terms and conditions of their employment or other mutual aid and
protection.
29 U.S.C. § 151 (1976). See NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 126 (1944).
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original jurisdiction over alleged violations of statutory mandates.
Such a standard should also define the impact of alternative avenues of
review on a determination of jurisdiction. Clear guidelines will reduce
the likelihood of judicial infringement of Board discretion and will re-

duce the number of unwarranted interruptions in the representation
process. To achieve these goals, a standard should permit district court
jurisdiction only if. the Board has violated a nondiscretionary provision of the Act; challenging parties have exhausted their administrative
remedies; and challenging parties possess no other effective means of
recourse to the judiciary.
Requiring courts to determine whether the Board has violated a

nondiscretionary provision of the Act recognizes the need to avoid judicial interference in areas of Board discretion and directly focuses a
court's attention on that important consideration. The discretionarynondiscretionary distinction 139 also provides a guideline to aid courts
in analyzing statutory mandates.
Determining whether a nondiscretionary provision of the Act has
been violated should involve an assessment of relevant statutory provisions and, if necessary,140 their legislative history. Additionally, courts
should consider Board practices not specifically authorized by statute
that have developed and become accepted over time. 14 1 Such thorough
analysis is necessary to determine when the Board is allowed to exer-

cise its discretion and to ensure proper interpretation of statutory
provisions.

142

139. Essentially factual determinations would be considered discretionary under this standard.
See generally 56 NoTRE DAME LAw. 315, 325 (1980). See note 81 supra and text accompanying
note 111 supra.
140. Consideration of legislativi history is usually impermissible when the statute is unambiguous. See, e.g., Wilbur v. United States, 284 U.S. 231, 237 (1931).
141. The court advocated a similar approach in National Maritime Union v. NLRB, 375 F.
Supp. 421 (E.D. Pa.), aft'd,506 F.2d 1052 (3d Cir. 1974), cer. denied, 421 U.S. 963 (1975). Judge
Fogel, after an excellent review of the evolution of the Kne standard, stated:
From our review ... we are persuaded that the exception enunciated in the majority
holding in Kjne should neither be mechanically restricted to violations of "shall not"
clauses of the Act, nor automatically extended to any clause which contains the word
"shall" or similar language of apparently mandatory intent. Rather, it is the task of the
District Court to carefully examine the provision in question, and to determine from the
context, from the structure and purposes of the Act as a whole, from prior practice in the
Board and decisions in the Courts, whether the terms are indeed sufficiently "clear and
mandatory" to confer jurisdiction under the rule of Kyne.
375 F. Supp. at 429-30.
142. In Intertype Co. v. Penello, 269 F. Supp. 573 (W.D. Va. 1967), for example, an employer
filed suit in district court to compel production of an investigation file compiled by the Board.
The employer argued that the Board, by refusing to divulge the file, violated the specific mandate
found in section 9(d) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 159(d) (1976). Section 9(d) provides that whenever
an order of the Board is based in whole or in part on facts certified following an investigation, the
"certification and the record of such investigation shall be included in the transcript of the entire
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The second part of the proposed standard requires parties to exhaust their administrative remedies before seeking relief in the district
courts. This requirement ensures that the Board is given the opportu-

1 43
nity to develop fully the factual record necessary for judicial review.
The Board also can correct errors committed by the regional directors' 44 and thus reverse decisions that otherwise would provide grounds

for district court jurisdiction. 145

The third part of the proposed standard requires a district court to
decline jurisdiction if effective 46 subsequent recourse to the judiciary is
available.147 Parties who could secure access to the courts through a
post-election method of review, such as section 10(f),1 4 8 should be denied district court jurisdiction. Although this part of the standard imposes additional costs on these parties, 49 the resulting reduction in the
dilatory use of district court jurisdiction outweighs this burden. This
record" subject to review. Id The court stated that "[a] literal reading of Section 9(d) would
appear to support the Company's position," 269 F. Supp. at 579; it found, however, that the Board
would be able to conduct effective investigations only if it preserved the confidentiality of its
findings. Id at 580. Thus, the court held that "the production of the investigation file must rest
within the sound discretion of the Board, and consequently Section 9(d) does not establish a 'specific statutory right,' the abrogation of which would be ground for this court's taking jurisdiction."
Id
143. It is generally desirable for an administrative agency to develop the factual record in
order to have the benefit of the agency's expertise. See Erzatty v. Puerto Rico, 648 F.2d 770, 774
(1st Cir. 1981).
144. See notes 134-35 supra and accompanying text.
145. The exhaustion requirement can, of course, be waived when pursuit of an administrative
remedy would be futile or when other judicially recognized exceptions to the requirement exist.
See K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW §§ 20.01, .07 (3d ed. 1972).
146. An example of an ineffective means of securing judicial review is that provided by section
8(b)(7)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(7)(B) (1976). The section 8(b)(7)(B) means of review is inadequate
because of its speculative nature. See notes 42-54 supra and accompanying text.
147. Thus, the third part of the suggested standard, combined with the exhaustion of administrative remedies requirement, essentially means that parties must have no other effective means
available to secure district court jurisdiction. Cf.Long Island RR Co. v. United States, 193 F.
Supp. 795, 800 (E.D.N.Y. 1961) (Friendly, J.)(a district court may entertain a suit to enjoin an
Interstate Commerce Commission suspension order only if the complaint shows the suspension is
"plainly without statutory authority" and the aggrieved party has no other available remedy).
148. 29 U.S.C. § 160(f) (1976). See notes 33-41 rupra and accompanying text.
149. See note 132 supra and accompanying text. Intangible costs, such as the possible stigma
of initially losing a representation election, cannot be avoided by an employer under the proposed
standard because an employer cannot obtain pre-election relief under this standard. A union,
however, may be able to avoid these costs by enjoining an election it feels it may lose, for it can
attempt to secure pre-election injunctive relief under the suggested test. This disparity in ability to
prevent a representation election one might lose can be equalized. A court faced with a union suit
to enjoin an election may permit the election to occur but order the Board to impound the ballots
until the court passes upon the union's claim. See Goldberg, supra note 26, at 506. Several courts
have adopted this solution. See, e.g., Miami Newspaper Printing Pressmen's Union v. McCulloch,
322 F.2d 993, 996 (D.C. Cir. 1963); Livingston v. McLeod, 209 F. Supp. 606, 611 (S.D.N.Y. 1962);
Int'l Prod. Union, Local 710 v. McLeod, 183 F. Supp. 790, 792 (E.D.N.Y. 1960).
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portion of the suggested test therefore allows the representation process
to proceed smoothly and, in combination with the other elements of the
proposed standard, provides a possible solution to the problems
presented by Leedom v. Kyne.
III.

CONCLUSION

The application of Leedom v. Kyne to those provisions of the Act
cast in nonprohibitory terms has led to inconsistent jurisdictional determinations. The dissent in PhysiciansNationalHouse StaffAssociation v.

Fanning reformulated the Kyne standard in an attempt to eliminate
this confusion. Because the dissent's standard does not accomplish this
purpose, this note proposes a new standard to determine district court
jurisdiction. The suggested standard allows for thorough judicial analysis of statutory provisions. It also restricts employer access to the
courts prior to a representation election.
Although the proposed standard provides a possible solution to the
jurisdictional problems associated with Kyne, it is only a partial response to the difficulties posed by judicial intervention in the representation process. Problems remain in determining what types of
constitutional violations are sufficient to invoke district court jurisdiction.150 The suggested standard, however, discourages judicial encroachment into areas of decisionmaking delegated specifically to the
Board and therefore may provide for more efficient resolution of labor
disputes.
James F Wyatt III

150. See notes 55-60 supra and accompanying text.

